Frightening and High : The Supreme Court\u27s Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics by Ellman, Ira Mark & Ellman, Tara
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2015
"Frightening and High": The Supreme Court's
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics
Ira Mark Ellman
Tara Ellman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ellman, Ira Mark and Ellman, Tara, ""Frightening and High": The Supreme Court's Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics"
(2015). Constitutional Commentary. 419.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/419
"FRIGHTENING AND HIGH": THE 
SUPREME COURT'S CRUCIAL MISTAKE 
ABOUT SEX CRIME STATISTICS 
Ira Mark Ellman* 
Tara Ellman** 
It isn't what we don't know that gives us trouble, it's what we 
know that ain't so. 1 
In McKune v. Life, 536 U.S. 24,33 (2002), the Supreme Court 
reversed two lower courts in rejecting, 5-4, Robert Lile's claim 
that Kansas violated his 5th Amendment rights by punishing him 
for refusing to complete a form detailing all his prior sexual 
activities, including any that might constitute an uncharged 
criminal offense for which he could then be prosecuted. The form 
was part of a prison therapy program that employed a polygraph 
examination to verify the accuracy and completeness of the sexual 
history which program participants were required to reveal. Lile 
had earned placement in a lower-security prison unit, but the 
automatic punishment imposed on him for declining to complete 
this form included permanent transfer to a higher security unit 
where he would live among the most dangerous inmates, and lose 
significant prison privileges, including the right to earn the 
minimum wage for his prison work and send his earnings to his 
family. 
Justice Kennedy, justifying this conclusion for the four-
person plurality, wrote that the recidivism rate "of untreated 
offenders has been estimated to be as high as 80°/o." The 
treatment program, he explained, "gives inmates a basis ... to 
identify the traits that cause such a frightening and high risk of 
* Charles J. Merriam Distinguished Professor of Law, Affiliate Professor of 
Psychology, Arizona State University; Distinguished Affiliated Scholar, Center for the 
Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley. 
** Consultant, Tempe, Arizona. 
1. Often attrihuted to Will Rogers or to Mark Twain, hut neither attrihution 
appears to he documented. See Boh Kalsey, "It Ain't What You Don't Know", WELL, 
Now, BOB (July 1, 200X), http://wellnowhoh.hlogspot.com. 
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recidivism." The following year in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) the 
Court upheld Alaska's application, to those convicted before its 
enactment, of a law identifying all sex offenders on a public registry. It 
reasoned that the ex post facto clause was not violated because 
registration is not punishment, but merely a civil measure reasonably 
designed to protect public safety. Now writing for a nnajority, Justice 
Kennedy's Smith opinion recalled his earlier language in McKune: 
Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense 
provides evidence of substantial risk of recidilvism. The 
legislature's findings arc consistent with grave concerns over 
the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and 
their dangerousness as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by 
sex offenders is "frightening and high." McKune v. Lilc, 536 U. 
S. 24, 34 (2002). 
This "frightening and high" recidivism rate of "sex offenders" 
(more on the term "sex offender" later) is a cornmonly offered 
justification for the increasingly harsh set of post -release collateral 
consequences imposed on them, nearly all triggered by their inclusion 
in sex offender registries. An example is the voters' pamphlet argument 
for the California initiative known as Jessica's Law, which imposed 
extraordinary residency restrictions on sex offenders and also required 
them to wear location-monitoring ankle bracelets for life. These 
extreme measures were justified, the argument explained, by sex 
offenders' "very high recidivism rates."2 
Residency restrictions like those in Jessica's Law are severe 
enough to exclude registrants from most available housing in their 
community, preventing them from living with their fan1ilies. 3 Separate 
"presence restrictions" in many communities bar registrants from using 
public libraries or enjoying public parks with their families. 4 Their 
registration formally excludes them from many jobs,5 and as a practical 
2. This was noted in People v. Mosley, 60 Cal. 4th 1044, 1061 n.lO, 344 P.3d 7XX, 1X5 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 251 (2015). For the actual voters' pamphlet summarizing the provisions, 
providing arguments for and against, and containing the law's full text, sec 
h Up:/ /www. votcrguidc .sos.ca.gov /pas t/2006/gcncral/props/propX3/propX3. h tm (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2015). 
3. For specifics, sec the data dcscrihcd in In re Taylor, 60 Cal. 4th 1019, 343 P.3d 
X67, 1X4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6X2 (2015). Russell Banks wrote a novel, Lost Memory of Skin 
(2011 ), hascd on the camp of sex offenders who lived under the Julia Little Causeway in 
Miami, where residency restrictions ldt them no other choices. See Charles McGrath, A 
Novelist Bypasses the Middle to Seek Out the Margins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at C1. 
4. See, e.g., Amy Meek, Street Vendors, Taxicabs, and fxclusion Zones: The Impact 
of Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions at the Local Level, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. I, 
23-24 (2014). 
5. See, e.g., Matt Mellema, Not Wanted: Sex Offenders, SLATE MAGAZINE (Aug. 14, 
2014), 
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matter keeps them from many more. The registration requirement 
typically extends for decades, and in some states, such as California, for 
life, with no path off the registry for most registrants. Challenges to the 
registration requirement, and the consequences that flow from it, are 
usually turned back by courts and politicians who often quote Justice 
Kennedy's dramatic language describing the recidivism rate for sex 
offenders as "frightening and high." A Lexis search of legal materials 
found that phrase in 91 judicial opinions, as well as briefs in 101 cases. 
Two examples from state supreme courts give the flavor of these 
decisions. The Iowa Supreme Court, while expressing sympathy for the 
"difficulties" that state's residency restrictions created for the 
"offender and his family, who lack financial resources,"6 still rejected 
his constitutional challenge to them because "the risk of recidivism 
posed by sex offenders is 'fri9htening and high", as "numerous 
authorities have acknowledged." Despite this reference to "numerous 
authorities," only Justice Kennedy's language in Smith was cited. A 
Kansas law mandating lifetime post-release supervision of all sex 
offenders applied to a 25-year old man convicted of consensual 
intercourse with a fifteen year old girl who testified she had 
"encouraged" his behavior. x A Corrections Department psychologist 
testified that he had accepted responsibility for his actions, displayed 
an "appropriate level of remorse," and was at low risk to re-offend.9 
The Kansas Supreme Court nonetheless rejected his challenge to the 
statutes' mandated lifetime supervision, citing Smith, and explaining 
the legislature could reasonably have "grave concerns over the high 
rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders" whose risk of 
recidivism "is frightening and high." 10 
Given the impact of the language in Smith and McKune, it seems 
important to know whether it's true-whether those convicted of sex 
offenses indeed re-offend at an 80o/o rate that is both "frightening and 
high," and much greater than the rate for other offenders. 
McKune provides a single citation to support its statement "that 
the recidivism rate of untreated offenders has been estimated to be as 
high as 80°/o": the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nat. Institute of Corrections, 
A Practitioner's Guide to Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender 
xiii (1988). Justice Kennedy likely found that reference in the amicus 
http://www .slate.com/ articles/news_and_po I i tics/j u risprudence/20 14/( lX/seve ral_s ta tes_ ba 
n_peoplc_in_the_sex_offender _registry _from_a_bizarre_list.h tml. 
6. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 664 (Iowa 2005). 
7. /d. at 665. 
X. State v. Mossman, 2X1 P.3d 153, 160 (Kan. 2012). 
9. /d. at 157, 161. 
10. /d. at 160. 
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brief supporting Kansas filed by the Solicitor General, then Ted Olson, 
as the SG's brief also cites it for the claim that sex offenders have this 
astonishingly high recidivism rate. This Practitioner's Guide 11 itself 
provides but one source for the claim, an article published in 1986 in 
Psychology Today, a mass market magazine aimed at a lay audience. 12 
That article has this sentence: "Most untreated sex offenders released 
from prison go on to commit more offenses-indeed, as many as 80o/o 
do." 13 But the sentence is a bare assertion: the article contains no 
supporting reference for it. Nor does its author appear to have the 
scientific credentials that would qualify him to testify at trial as an 
expert on recidivism. 14 He is a counselor, not a scholar of sex crimes or 
re-offense rates, and the cited article is not about recidivism statistics. 
It's about a counseling program for sex offenders he then ran in an 
Oregon prison. His unsupported assertion about the recidivism rate for 
untreated sex offenders was offered to contrast with his equally 
unsupported assertion about the lower recidivism rate for those who 
complete his program. 
11. While the Practitioner's Guide is a publication of the Justice Department, the 
Preface notes that its contents present the views "of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice," a distinction 
lost to readers of the Court's opinion. 
12. Rohcrt E. Frccman-Longo & R. Wall, Changing a I4etime of Sexual Crime, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 19H6, at 5K Freeman-Longo is the author dcscrihcd in the rest 
of this paragraph. Wall, the second author, is identified in the article as a therapist in a 
treatment program Frccman-Longo directed; no further information ahout him came up 
in a Google search. 
13. /d. at 64. 
14. The modern understanding of the relevant rule on expert testimony, Federal 
Rules of Evidence 702. is explained in Dauhcrt v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. 509U.S. 
579 (1993). and the cases following upon it. The Psvcholo~v Todav article docs not indicate 
the author's training, hut a Googlc search found that his only professional degree is a 
Master of Rehabilitation Counseling. His online CV indicates no academic or research 
appointments at any institution. hut docs list him as the second author in a 19X2 article in 
the iournal Crime and Delinouencv: Undetected Recidivism Amon£ Ravists and Child 
Molesters, 2H CRIME AND DELINQ. 450. The article reported what some incarcerated men 
said when asked if they had previously committed a sexual assault. The sample was men 
imprisoned in a maximum security Connecticut institution. or committed to a secured 
Florida treatment center for sexual offenders, who agreed to answer the uucstions. Most 
already had multiple convictions for rape or child molestation. The answers given hy this 
small convenience sample of high-risk offenders tells one very little ahout the recidivism 
rate of sex offenders in general. even assuming the answers were truthful and accurate. 
Indeed, perhaps ironically, given the usc the Court made of his statement, the author has 
elsewhere expressed the view that current registration laws "may do more harm than 
good" hccausc. among other things, thcv apply to many people who arc low-risk and often 
hurdcn efforts at rehabilitation. Rohcrt E. Frccman-Longo, Revisitimz Me~an's Law and 
Sex Offender Re~istration: Prevention or Problem. in SEXUAL VIOLENCE: POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND CHALLENGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (James Hodgson 
& Dchra Kelley, cds .. 2001 ). It appears the author has in recent vcars moved from 
traditional counscllin!.'. to providin!.'. hiofccdhack services under the name Serendipity 
Hcalin!.'. Arts; see SERENDIPITY HEALING ARTS, http://rohlongo.com/indcx.php (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
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So the evidence for McKune's claim that offenders have high re-
offense rates (and the effectiveness of counseling programs in reducing 
it) was just the unsupported assertion of someone without research 
expertise who made his living selling such counseling programs to 
• 15 pnsons. 
The Solicitor General's brief in Smith is also the likely source of a 
second influential phrase about sex offenders. The brief frames the 
question before the Court with this opening statement: 
Sex offenders exact a uniquely severe and unremitting toll on 
the Nation and its citizens for three basic reasons: "[tjhey are 
the least likely to be cured"; "[ t]hey are the most likely to 
reoffend"; and "[t]hey prey on the most innocent members of 
our society." United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS), National Conf. on Sex Offender Registries 
(National Conf.) 93 (Apr. 1998). 
The Smith opinion did not quote this language, but others have. 
One example is the preamble to California's Jessica's Law, which 
attributes the quoted language to an otherwise unidentified "1998 
report by the U.S. Department of Justice." 16 The California Supreme 
Court's citation attributed the same lan~uage to "a report by the 
United States Department of Justice." 7 The language has also 
15. The Solicitor General was complicit in urging the Court toward this conclusion 
with the argument that "I tjhc ahscncc of ready and rcasonahle alternatives for reducing 
recidivism among convicted sexual offenders holsters the constitutionality of I Kansas's 
Sexual Ahusc Treatment Program 1." Amicus Brief of the United States at 24, McKune v. 
Lile, 536 N.W.2d 24 (2002) (No. 00-11H7). 
16. The statement was in the voter's pamphlet explanation of the law. See People v. 
Aguon, No. D053H75, 2009 Cal. App. Unpuh. LEXIS 9H36 at *37, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. filed 
Dec. 14, 2009). The initiative made changes to various provisions of the California law; the 
key changes arc summarized in People v. Mosley, 603 Cal. 4th 1044, 1063-64, 344 P.3d 7HR, 
I R5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251 (2015). There is some confusion ahout the law's actual effect. The 
residency restrictions have historically hccn applied to those on parole from a state sex 
offense, hut not to other registrants, hut the language is hroadcr and in Mosley the 
California Supreme Court recently declined to decide its scope. In a companion case, the 
California Supreme Court found the residency restrictions unconstitutional as applied to 
parolees in San Diego County, In re Taylor, 60 Cal. 4th 1019, 343 P.3d H67, 1 H4 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 6H2 (2015). Jessica's Law also requires all registrants to wear GPS devices so that their 
whcrcahouts can he continuously monitored hy state authorities. The scope of this 
requirement has not hccn contested, hut at the moment California enforces it against 
current parolees only. 
17. The California opinion, in rejecting an offender's claim that he was improperly 
placed on the registry and made potentially subject to the residency restrictions, explains 
the residency restrictions as "relatively modern attempts to address, hy means short of 
secure confinement, the persistent prohlem of recidivism among sex offenders," and then 
in footnote 10 quotes the initiative language, noting that it "lrclicsl on a report hy the 
United States Department of Justice." People v. Mosley, 60 Cal. 4th 1044, 344 P.3d 7HR, 
IH5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251 (2015). 
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appeared in several local ordinances in the Midwest. 1x Yet the 
statement is rather odd. What does it mean to say that sex offenders 
are "the least likely to be cured?" Least likely to be cured of what? Of 
the inclination to commit sex offenses? In that case, who's more likely 
to be cured? People who don't have that inclination in the first place? 
It's hard to imagine any scientist making such an incoherent statement, 
and a search for the referenced "Justice Department Report" reveals 
that none did. The "report" is merely a collection of speeches given at 
a 1998 conference of advocates for sex offender registries. The 
collection's cover sheet disavows any Justice Department endorsement 
of its contents. 1')The "least likely" phrase is taken from a speech in this 
collection given by a politician from Plano, Texas, who never claimed 
any scientific basis for it. Indeed, she did not even claim it was true. 
What she actually said was that it is a statement she likes to make. 20 The 
Solicitor General's representation of this statement as a Justice 
Department conclusion about the nature of sex offenders was at best 
irresponsible. 
So what is there-offense rate for those convicted of a sex offense? 
One cannot calculate it without first defining "re-offense," without 
specifying the time period to employ, and without considering whether 
one needs to distinguish among different groups of offenders said to 
have committed a "sex offense." We consider these points in tum. 
The right definition of re-offense depends on what we want to 
know: is it the proportion of released offenders who co1mmit a crime of 
any kind, or a serious crime of any kind, or a sex crime (of any degree)? 
If the purpose of the sex offender registry the Court addressed in Smith 
I X. The language is quoted in several laws in Wisconsin and Michigan. See Tamara 
Rice Lave, The Iconic Child Molester: What We Believe and Why We Believe It 55-56 
(Apr. 15, 200X) (unpuhlished manuscript), available at hup://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papcrs.dm?ahstract_id= 111 X554. 
19. "Contents of this document do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the 
Bureau ofJ usticc Statistics or the lJ .S. Department of J usticc." Bureau of J usticc Statistics, 
National Conference on Sex Offender Registries, Proceedings of a BJS/SEARCH 
Conference, April 199X, NCJ-16X965, at p. ii. 
20. Her precise words, as set forth in the conference proceedings: "Sex offenders arc 
a very unique type of criminal. I like to say they have three very unique characteristics: 
They arc the least likely to he cured; they arc the most likely to rcoffcnd; and they prey on 
the most innocent mcmhcrs of our society." !d. at pp. 92-93. The politician was Texas state 
senator Florence Shapiro. Shapiro was a schoolteacher. When she rctitrcd from the Texas 
State Senate in 2013 she was quoted as saying "her proudest achievement came in 1995 
when she introduced a set of hills called Ashley's Laws, which arc designed to protect 
children from sexual predators." Matthew Watkins, Retiring Plano Legislator Horence 
Shapiro Plans To Continue Community Work, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 5, 
2013 ), http://www .da llasncws.com/ncws/comm unit y-ncws/collin-coUJ1 t y /hcadlincs/20130 
I 05-rctiring-plano-lcgislator -plans-to-con tin uc-communi t y-work.ccc. A researcher who 
asked Shapiro in 2007 for the hasis of her "least likely/most likely" statement was promised 
an answer hy her stall, hut never received one. Lave, supra note 1 X at 55. 
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is to aid the police in investigating sex offenses, or warn the public 
about persons thought likely to commit them, then we want to know 
the rate at which those convicted of a sex offense commit another one. 
That's quite different than the rate at which they commit any act that 
returns them to prison. The California Corrections Department 
recently examined cases of sex offender registrants who are returned 
to prison, and found that in 92 o/o of the cases the reason was a parole 
violation, which is generally something that is not a crime for anyone 
who is not on parole- things like going to a bar or visiting a friend 
who's also an ex-felon. Less than 1 °/o of those re-incarcerated had 
committed a new sex offense. 21 
The time period we ask about of course also matters: As one 
lengthens the follow-up period, one would expect to find more re-
offenses. So the most cautious measure would ask whether an offender 
ever commits another sex offense. But answering that question would 
require following offenders until their death. Of course, a study limited 
to deceased offenders would necessarily exclude most released in 
recent decades. Long-term follow-up studies are available, however, 
and a recent meta-analysis by a leading scholar in the area, Karl 
Hanson, combines the data from 21 studies that followed offenders for 
an average of 8.2 years, and for as long as 31.22 Nearly 8,000 offenders 
were followed, overall. The use of a meta-analysis to combine the data 
from all these long-term studies provides more confident projections of 
long-term re-offense rates. Sixteen of the 21 studies were done on 
offenders in other western countries (most often, Canada) where 
sentences are typically shorter than in the U.S., and released offenders 
are not subject to American-style offender registries. 23 The 21 studies 
included in this meta-analysis examined different populations of 
offenders; one might expect the modal offender in some studies to 
present a higher risk of re-offense than the modal offender in others. 
21. CALIF. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, 2014 OUTCOME 
EVALUATION REPORT, 30 (July 2015), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult 
_Rcscarch_Branch/Rcscarch_Documcn ts/20 14_ Outcomc_Evalua tion_Rcp< Jrt_7 -6-
2015.pdL The exact rate was O.WX,. Another 2% of the cases involved violation of the sex 
offender registry rules, such as failing to update registry information on schedule, while 
the remaining 5.3% of those returned to prison committed a new offense that was not a 
sex crime. 
22. R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R. Harris, Leslie Helm us, and David Thornton, High-
Risk Sex Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever, 2"J (15) J. OF INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 2792, 27"J2-X 13 (2014 ). The median year of release was 1"J%; the release year 
ranged from 1 Y57 to 2007. 
23. Ten of the 21 studies involved Canadian offenders. For a comparison of Canadian 
and American laws, discussing why Canada adopted a much less aggressive approach to 
sex offenders, sec Michael Pctrunik, The 1/are and Tortoise: Dangerousness and Sex 
Offender Policy in the United States and Canada, 45 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. 
JUST. 43 (2003). 
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But having such a variety of offenders is another advantage. The 
authors were able to assess offender risk levels using a well-established 
actuarial measure,24 the Static 99-R,25 to classify each of the individual 
offenders in all21 studies as low, medium, or high risk. 
Consider first the high-ri.,k offenders in this study. Nearly 20°/o of 
them committed26 a new sex offense within five years of release, and 
32°/o (an additional 12o/o) did so within 15 years. But high-risk 
offenders who hadn't committed a new sex offense within fifteen years 
of their release rarely did later. Indeed, none of the high-risk offenders 
who were offense-free after 16 years committed a sex offense 
thereafter.27 This point is important because most people are typically 
put on registries for decades, and often for life. Being offense-free for 
twenty years, or more, will not get them removed even though this 
history tells us the chance of their committing a new offense is very 
small. Some context can help here. One recent study found that about 
3 o/o of felons with no known history of sex offenses conlillit one within 
24. In clinical judgments a professional combines or processes information ahout the 
person in his or her head, rendering an intuitive assessment said to he hascd on training 
and experience. Actuarial judgments, hy contrast, arc hascd entirely on empirically 
established relations between data and the condition or event of interest. The relationship 
can he set out in a tahlc or formula. A life insurance agent uses the actuarial method when 
he assesses life expectancy, or the likelihood of causing an automobile accident, hy 
entering data into a formula, or consulting tables and charts that relate the data to the 
event to he predicted. The nature of the actuarial method thus encourages predictions 
hascd on objective assessable facts that can he summarized num..:rically. The agent 
employing a clinical method might look at the same data, hut might consider other factors 
as well, and would in any event assess risk intuitively rather than hy rclcrcncc to a formula 
or tahle. Rohyn M. Dawes, David Faust, and Paul E. Meehl, Clinical versus Actuarial 
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 716, 
716 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahncman, cds., 2002). The psychological 
literature has repeatedly shown that actuarial judgments yield better predictions of future 
behavior than do clinical judgments. !d. A recent Canadian study showed that general rule 
applied (as one would expect) in the context of predicting criminal recidivism in general, 
and sexual rc-offcnsc in particular. The study allowed assessors to usc their professional 
judgment to adjust the risk level score obtained from a commonly used actuarial measure, 
and compared the predictive accuracy of their adjusted rating to the unadjusted actuarial 
score. The assessor adjustments made the rc-offcnsc predictions less accurate, largely 
because they mistakenly predicted a higher chance of rc-offcnsc than was in fact the case. 
J. Stephen Wormith, Sarah Hogg, & Lina Guzzo, The Predictive Validity of a General 
Risk/Needs Assessment Inventory on Sexual Offender Recidivism and an Exploration of the 
Professional Override, 39 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 1511, 1529-32 (2012). 
25. See R. Karl Hanson, Alyson Lunetta, Amy Phenix, Janet Neeley & Doug 
Epperson, The f'ield Validity of Static-99/R Sex Offender Risk Assessment Tool in 
California, I J. Of THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MGMT. 102 (2014). 
26. What constitutes having "committed" a new offense depends on the criterion 
used in the individual study. Eleven of the 21 studies logged a new offense for any offender 
who was charged; the other ten required a new conviction. Hanson ct al., supra note 22. 
27. There were 126 high-risk offenders followed after 17 years who had not yet rc-
offcndcd; 61 of them were followed for at least five additional years and none rc-offcndcd. 
Hanson ct al., supra note 25, at n.12. 
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4.5 years of their release. 2~ Of course, they are not on the sex offender 
registry during their release period, even though the chance of their 
committing a sex offense is higher than the chance of a new sex offense 
by a high-risk sex offender who has been offense-free for fifteen years. 
Indeed, it's mistaken to think of anyone who's been offense-free 
for fifteen years as high-risk. At the time of their release we cannot tell 
which high-risk offenders will be among the two-thirds who won't re-
offend, but that is revealed over time. Those who haven't re-offended 
after fifteen years are not high-risk for doing so, regardless of their 
offense or their initial risk assessment. 29 One cannot accurately assess 
an individual's risk of committing an offense in the future if one ignores 
what they have done-and not done-for the last fifteen, twenty, or 
2X. Wormith ct al., supra note 24. This study followed I ,905 sex offenders, and 24,545 
nonsexual offenders, who were released in Ontario, Canada, during 2004. The mean 
follow-up period for hoth groups was 4.5 years, with a standard deviation of I 06 days. 3.73 
percent of the sex offenders (97% male), committed another sex offense during the follow-
up period; 3.17 percent of the nonsexual offenders (XOSX, male) did so. See Wormith ct 
al., supra no.tc 23, at 1521 thl. I. The difference hetwccn these two percentages was not 
statistically significant. There was also no difference hetwccn the groups in rate of non-
sexual violent offenses. /d. 
29. Another statement in Smith v. Doe ("Empirical research on child molesters, for 
instance, has shown that 'lclontrary to conventional wisdom, most rcoffcnscs do not occur 
within the first several years after release, hut may occur as late as 20 years following 
release," 53X U.S. at 104) is sometimes cited for the claim that sex offenders remain at high 
risk of re-offcnding for life. Here Smith cites Rohcrt A. Prcntky, Raymond A. Knight, and 
Austin F.S. Lee, Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues, National Institute of Justice 
Research Report, NCJ 163390 (1997). But the more complete puhlishcd version of this 
study, Rohcrt A. Prcntky, Austin E. S. Lee, Raymond A. Knight, and David Ccrcc, 
Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological Analysis, 21 L. & 
HUM. BEHA v. 635 (1997), reveals why it is inapt. The study's offender sample consisted of 
rapists and child molesters released from the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually 
Dangerous Persons, cstahlishcd in 1959 "for the purpose of evaluating and treating 
individuals convicted of repetitive and/or aggressive sexual offenses." /d. at 637. As 
Prcntky and his coauthors themselves ohscrvc, "Sexual offenders sampled from general 
criminal populations, from offenders committed to a state hospital, and from a maximum 
security psychiatric hospital, arc likely to differ in ways that would affect their recidivism 
rates and make cross-sample comparisons difficult." /d. at 636. The data in this older study 
arc also difficult to interpret hccausc we aren't given the numhcr of offenders followed for 
any given length of time. We arc told, however, that the total sample of offenders convicted 
of child molestation was just 115. Clearly, the suhsct they were ahle to follow for ten or 
fifteen years was much smaller, hut we do not know how much smaller hccausc they do 
not provide that numhcr. We do know that the rc-offcnsc rate from a sample of just ten or 
twenty offenders would he too small to he meaningful. By contrast, the 2014 Hanson study 
dcscrihcd in the text provides complete information on the 7,740 offenders it followed. 
Prcntky himself (with coauthors) recently reviewed studies on the effectiveness of offender 
treatment programs, in a hook evaluating research on sex offender recidivism, and found 
treatment effects were small or ahscnt. But they explain that one reason why treatment 
docs not reduce rc-offcnsc rates very much is that the rates for control groups of untreated 
offenders is already quite low. Indeed, they found rates that were similar to those found in 
the Hanson study. ROBERT PRENTKY, HOWARD BARBAREE, AND ERIC JANUS, SEXUAL 
PREDATORS: SOCIETY, RISK, AND THE LAW 243-244 (2015). 
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twenty-five years in the past. Yet that is exactly what sex offender 
registries do for large groups of people listed on them. 
And what about those who were not classified high-risk in the first 
place? About 97.5°/o of the low-risk offenders were offense-free after 
five years; about 95o/o were still offense-free after 15 years. 30 Thus, a 
simple actuarial test identifies a large group of sex offenders whom we 
know are, from the outset, less likely to commit a sex offense after 
release than are released felons with no sex offense history (who of 
course are not on the registry). What about the chance of a sex offender 
committing some other serious crime? Other studies f~t1d that released 
sex offenders are less likely to commit a new felony of any kind, after 
release, than are other released felons. 31 
People may assume that most registrants committed violent rapes 
or molested children, but they would be wrong. State laws require 
registration of a teenager who had consensual sex with another 
teenager, of people who possessed erotic images of anyone under 18 
but had no history of any contact offense, and even, depending on the 
state, someone convicted of public urination.32 A Justice Department 
study concluded that more than a quarter of all sex offenders 
committed their offense when they were themselves a minor. 33 If the 
registry's main purpose is to let us monitor and wart1 people about 
those who committed violent, coercive, or exploitative contact sex 
offenses, we dilute its potential usefulness when we fill it up with people 
who never did any of those things. 
Or, people who once did but are very unlikely to do so again 
because it's been many years since they committed any crime. The 
respondents in Smith who challenged the Alaska registry were 
classified as "aggravated" sex offenders, required under Alaska law to 
register four time,"; a year for life, because they had been pled nolo 
30. These figures arc all taken from Tahlc 2 of Hanson ct al., supra note 22. The high 
risk group was 26'1<> of the entire sample of 7,740 offenders; the low risk group was 11.5%. 
31. !d. at p. 2. While 43% of released sex offenders were rearrested for some crime 
within three years of release, 6X% of the released non-sex offenders were, and a higher 
proportion of them were charged with a felony (X4%) than was true of the rearrested sex 
offenders (75% ). 
32. Chanakya Sethi, The Ridiculous Laws That Put People on the Sex Offender List, 
SLATE MAGAZINE (Aug. 12, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.slatc.com/articlcs/ncws_and_ 
politics/jurisprudcncc/2014/0X/mappcd_scx_offcndcr_rcgistry_laws_on_statutory_rapc_p 
uhlic_urination_and.html. 
33. David Finkclhor, Richard Ormrod & Mark Chaffin, Juveniles Who Commit Sex 
Offenses Against Minors, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINO. PREVENTION, JUV. JUST. 
BULLETIN 1, 1 (Dec. 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilcs1/ojjdp/227763.pdf. Juveniles 
account for 36% of all sex offenders with juvenile victims. !d. 
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contendere in 1984 to sexual contact with minors.34 They served their 
sentences and were released in 1990. One had completed a two-year 
post-release treatment program. The other had remarried after release 
and been granted custody of his daughter, the court having concluded 
he had been rehabilitated. (Psychiatric evaluations found he had "a 
very low risk of re-offending" and was "not a pedophile.") Neither had 
re-offended in the twelve years since release, a fact that alone predicts 
are-offense rate below 5o/o.3:\ Alaska posts the address and place of 
employment of all registrants for public viewing in print or electronic 
form, so that it can be used by "any person" and "for any purpose."36 
Alaska's registry rules are milder than some. California's and Florida's 
registries, for example, make no distinction among sex offenses; 
lifetime registration is required for all. A 14-year old in Florida who 
had consensual intimate contact with his 13-year old girlfriend would 
have to register for life. 37 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently held that treating 
everyone.convicted of a s~x ~ffense as a likely re-offender, when man~ 
are not, violates the constitutional guarantees of Due Process. In J.B.·· 
it considered changes to the Pennsylvania registry law that 
automatically placed juveniles on the offender registry for 25 years if 
thel commi~ted a rape or "a?gravated indecent ~ssa~lt" ~h~n over 
14. · The rationale for the registry law was the legislative flndmg that 
"Sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual 
offenses and protection of the public from this type of offender is a 
paramount governmental interest." The court objected that the 
affected juveniles were effectively subject to an "irrebuttable 
presumption" that they posed a high risk of re-offense even though the 
presumption is in fact "not universally true." 
The effect of registration was one key to the court's holding that 
this misclassification has constitutional significance. The plaintiffs had 
argued that registration "impedes a child's pathway to a normal 
productive life through continuously reinforcing the unlikely 
supposition that the youth has 'a high risk of committing additional 
sexual offenses,'" creating "difficulty obtaining housing, employment, 
34. The factual information in this paragraph ahout the offenders, and the provisions 
of Alaska law then in effect, is taken from the Ninth Circuit opinion that the Supreme 
Court reversed. Doc v. Ottc, 259 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir. 200 I). 
35. Hanson, ct al., supra note 22. 
36. The Ninth Circuit opinion that the Supreme Court reversed in Smith, Doc v. Ottc, 
259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) described Alaska Admin. Code tit. 13, § 09.050(a) (2<XXl) as then 
containing these provisions. 
37. Sethi, supra note 32. 
3~. In the IntcrcstofJ.B., 107 A.3d I (Pa.2014). 
39. !d. at 12. 
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and schooling" as well as "depression."40 Imposing these burdens on 
the plaintiffs unconstitutionally denied them Due Process, the court 
concluded, because individual offenders were allowed no meaningful 
opportunity to show the presumption of high risk was factually wrong 
in their case. Because good individualized measures of the likelihood 
ofre-offending are available, the state has no need to e1nploy, and thus 
endorse, global stereotypes that registered sex offenders are 
particularly dangerous, when these stereotypes have no basis in fact. 
Registration requirements "premised upon the presumption that all 
sexual offenders pose a high risk of recidivating . . . impinge upon 
juvenile offenders' fundamental right to reputation as protected under 
the Pennsylvania Constitution." 41 
The California Supreme Court used different labels but a similar 
logic when it held this year that it was unconstitutionally irrational to 
automatically subject every sex offender parolee in San Diego County 
to residency restrictions that impeded their rehabilitation and left many 
of them with no place to live. 42 Once again, the problem with the statute 
was its application to every sex offender, without regard to their 
individual circumstances including an individualized assessment of 
each offender's risk of re-offense. The court noted that parole officers 
have general supervisory authority over parolees that allows them to 
impose restrictions on their residence that are reasonably related to the 
particular parolee's situation. So the court allowed customized 
restrictions logically connected to the individual offender's situation, 
but not "one size fits all" restrictions imposed on all offenders. 
The logic of these decisions offers hope for a wider judicial 
rationalization of the rules on sex offender registries and the life 
restrictions that typically accompany them. To realize that hope, one 
must apply the principle common to the Pennsylvania and California 
decisions to a correct understanding of the facts. The principle is that 
concerns about public safety cannot justify policies that impose serious 
burdens on entire categories of individuals when many of them actually 
present little risk, at least when more accurate assessment criteria 
employing established actuarial measures, and the sin1ple passage of 
time, could easily be employed instead. The burdens imposed by 
registration and all the consequences that follows from it demand 
40. !d. at 33-34. 
41. !d. at 42-43. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not alone in its concern ahout 
the effect of registration on juveniles. Two years hdore, the Ohio Supreme Court held that 
imposing lifetime registration on juveniles constituted "cruel and unusual punishment"./n 
re C.P., %7 N.E.2d 729, 749 (Ohio 2012). Treating required registration as punishment 
accurately captures its impact on the registrant, and triggers additional constitutional 
protections, hut differs from the position taken hy the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith. 
42. In re Taylor, AO Cal. 4th 1019,343 P.3d Xh7, 1X4 Cal. Rptr. 3d AX2 (2015). 
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justifications grounded on more nuanced risk assessments than those 
the registration laws currently employ. The simple fact is that the risk 
level, for nearly everyone on the registry, is nowhere near the 
"frightening and high" rate assumed by Smith and McKune and all the 
later decisions that rely on them. 
But while the principles endorsed by these recent opinions offer 
hope, the Pennsylvania opinion also illustrates the difficulty of getting 
courts to understand the facts well enough to apply them properly. The 
court held that the burdens of registration on juveniles could not be 
justified because of their lower re-offense rate: "While adult sexual 
offenders have a high likelihood of reoffense, juvenile sexual offenders 
exhibit low levels of recidivism (between 2-7°/o ), which are 
indistinguishable from the recidivism rates for non-sexual juvenile 
offenders, who are not subject to SO RNA registration."43 But one can 
see that the court's comparison was infected by the very same error it 
condemned when it compares juveniles to all adults, making no 
distinction among adult registrants. The Hanson study finds the re-
offense rate for low and moderate-risk offenders, who probably 
account for most adults on the re.aistry, is within the same 2-7o/o range 
the court attributes to juveniles. 4 And of course, the re-offense rate 
then declines, for all registrants, with each year after release that they 
remain offense-free. Any state that routinely imposes 25-year 
registration requirements on adult offenders has a registry full of 
people who have gone ten or more years with no new offense, for 
whom the average likelihood of re-offense is well below 7°/o. The 
problem is worse in states like California and Florida that put all 
offenders on the registry for life. 
Writing on a different subject entirely, Eula Biss recently 
observed: 
Risk perception may not be about quantifiable risk so much as 
it is about immeasurable fear. Our fears are informed by 
history and economics, by social power and stigma, by myth 
and nightmares. And as with other strongly held beliefs, our 
43. In the Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d at 17. SORNA refers to the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, which is Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safcty Act of 2006 (Puhlic Law 109-24X). SO RNA sets out federal standards for sex 
offender registration and notification. Pennsylvania was one of seventeen states meeting 
these requirements; sec the compilation at SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION AcT, http://www.smart.gov/sorna.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
44. If one examines the sources the Pennsylvania court relics on for its conclusion 
that the rc-offcnsc rate for juveniles is 2 to 7 percent, one finds that it is a 5-ycar rc-offcnsc 
rate. Tahk 2 of the Hanson study shows a 5-ycar rc-olknsc rate of 2.2% for low-risk sex 
offenders, and 6.7'X, for moderate-risk offenders. These two groups together account for 
74.2% of Hanson's sample of 7,740 offenders. Hanson, et al., supra note 22, at 2X02. 
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fears are dear to us. When we encounter information that 
contradicts our beliefs, we tend to doubt the information, not 
ourselves. 45 
The label "sex offender" triggers fear, and disgust as well. Both 
responses breed beliefs that do not yield easily to facts. That's why even 
those politicians now urging criminal justice reforms conspicuously 
omit mentioning sex offenses when they argue for less punitive policies 
that would facilitate the offenders' reintegration into civil society.46 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has fed the fear. It's become the "go 
to" source that courts and politicians rely upon for "facts" about sex 
offender recidivism rates that aren't true. Its endorsement has 
transformed random opinions by self-interested nonexperts into 
definitive studies offered to justify law and policy, while real studies by 
real scientists go unnoticed. The Court's casual approach to the facts of 
sex offender re-offense rates is far more frightening than the rates 
themselves, and it's high time for correction. Perhaps there's now hope 
it may soon happen. 
45. EULA BISS, ON IMMUNITY: AN INOCULATION (2014), as quoted in Jerome 
Ciroopman, There's No Way Out oflt!, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 5, 2015, at 4. 
Biss (and Groopman) were writing ahout parents' irrational fears of inoculating their 
children. 
46. See Carl Hulse, Unlikely Cause Unites the l£ft and the Right: htstice Reform, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feh. 19,2015, at AI. 
